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HISTORY AS SOIL AND SEDIMENT 
Geological Tropes of Historicity in Heidegger, Husserl, and 
Merleau-Ponty 
JACOB MARTIN RUMP 
Many twentieth-century accounts of history have used geological tropes to de-
scribe the phenomenon of historical knowledge, and such terms have been of 
particular importance in the phenomenological tradition. In Heidegger's refer-
ences in Being and Time to the "soil of history," Husserl's account in his later 
work of "sedimentation" in the lifeworld, and the reformulation of this notion 
in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, geological tropes are used to illus-
trate important insights into the relation between contingency, a priority and 
historicity. This paper seeks to contribute to an understanding of history un-
derstood phenomenologically as historicity through an analysis of these geo-
logical tropes. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows: such geological tropes help the 
phenomenologist to describe the way in which history is always determined 
within a complex interplay between only temporarily fixed determining struc-
tures - such as riverbanks, insoluble sediment, soil, etc. - and free-flowing 
praxis, a situation in which historical events are at once determinant of and 
themselves determined by human activity. Paradoxically, the constant and 
"grounding" element in such conceptions of history is not the sediment and 
hard rock of historical fact, but the the constant change and variability-despite 
the sense-giving continuity - of human experience structured by historicity. 
We begin with a brief overview of the landscape on the philosophy of history 
in which these views arose, and then continue to an analysis of the tropes them-
selves. 
I. A Schematic History of Historicity 
This conception of history has a history. 1 The philosophy of history in the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in both Anglo-American and Continental 
traditions like other branches of theoretical philosophy - was marked by a 
characteristic epistemological turn.2 This more '"critical" philosophy of histo-
ry, as the moniker suggests, eschewed the speculative idealist pronouncements 
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of thinkers like Hegel, Croce, and Collingwood, whereby we can inquire into 
the nature and destiny of history in itself, arriving at timeless truths concerning 
the historical, and sought instead to focus on the nature and limitations of his-
torical knowledge by means of careful methodology. But as this episterriologi-
cal tum continued on toward the middle of the twentieth century, some phi-
losophers - notably though not exclusively3 those engaged in self-described 
phenomenological projects - nonetheless felt that, as unanswerable as seemed 
those timeless and speculative questions concerning the essence of history, the 
fact of historicity - that we are and experience the world as historical beings 
- is not simply present in our everyday lives but indeed definitive of human 
ways of being in the world. Thus, while sharing in the more general resistance 
to the speculative conception of history as an autonomous and self-enclosed 
area of inquiry about which universal and timeless truths can be discovered, 
these phenomenological thinkers of history also resisted the positivist and neo-
positivist views that arose in immediate reaction to it. For the recognition of 
historicity implies that historical inquiry is not simply continuous with the sci-
ences, and does not consist exclusively of inductive generalizations on the ba-
sis ofhistoricalfacts, since historicity is not something that happens but rather 
a character of the happening or event itself; a characteristic form of human 
experiencing independent - in some sense - from its content. 
The thinking of history through the phenomenon of historicity is further 
distinguished from other twentieth-century approaches in its insistence, a cor-
ollary to the claim above, that the recognition of historicity as a fundamental 
element of the human condition demands a rethinking of the character episte-
mological inquiry as such. Because of the centrality of historicity, the problem 
of historical knowledge can no longer be seen as merely a specialized sub-
question within the larger discipline of epistemology, to be left aside for sepa-
rate treatment; the problem of historical knowledge becomes according to 
these phenomenological currents of thought not merely one domain of episte-
mological inquiry among others, but a fundamental problem for any account of 
knowledge, because a fundamental element of human experience. 4 
And since the philosophers responsible for the development of the phenom-
enological conception of historicity all saw themselves working to some de-
gree in the post-Kantian Critical tradition, they remained insistent on the ongo-
ing interrogation of historicity and historical knowledge Critically, as 
phenomena of experiential life manifesting the limiting structure of subjectiv-
ity. As Kant recognized, reason - including historical reason - must be kept in 
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check through the insistence that its claims be constantly submitted to the tri-
bunal of experience. Thus - taking the liberty of characterizing their varied 
methodologies in common terms, though we should not forget that there re-
main important differences - Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty all pro-
ceeded by investigating the distance between accounts of historical knowledge 
and the lived historicity of actual experience, which is never a mere account or 
representation of fact, thereby building into their conceptions of history a rec-
ognition of the ways in which the theoretical account ultimately has fallen 
short of fully doing justice to history as a phenomenon of experience, and thus 
protecting their inquiries not only from the excesses ofrational speculation but 
also from the preconceptions of a neo-positivist history of brute facts. 
The phenomenological attempt to grapple with the phenomenon of history 
qua historicity was thus framed by (varied versions of) two basic and opposed 
positions: 1) The implicit speculative idealist reliance on a form of determin-
according to which history is understood, roughly, as the series of rational 
structures which by virtue of their containment determine all historical events 
in a way that allows - at least sub specie aeternitatis or from the standpoint of 
"absolute knowing," - complete predictability of all events and historical 
meanings; and 2), the positivist and neo-positivist's relativism regarding the 
historical in its own right, according to which, outside of our scientific gener-
alizations on the basis of historical facts, there is no determinant order in his-
tory as such, and history does not itself make sense in its unfolding but is made 
sense of through imposed external forms of explanation. Phenomenological 
conceptions of history as historicity sought to describe historical knowledge in 
a way that recognizes the legitimate insights of both extremes while simultane-
ously avoiding the complete ascription to either ofthem.5 
Geological tropes function as a unique means of approaching such a middle 
ground. They are employed in descriptions that avoid both of these extremes 
not - as we might expect - by staking a substantive middle ground, but by 
constantly retracing iterations of an intermediary strategy that resists the move 
to stake any ground at all. This strategy is open to the phenomenologist be-
cause of her locating of history in historicity, conceived within a schema de-
fined by the temporal difference between subjective and objective manifesta-
tions of the historical. These accounts of historical knowledge are best 
characterized not in terms of a sought after ground, but in terms of a formally 
definable movement; a constant reassessment of historicity that takes the place 
of grounding. The result is thus a peculiar sort of "groundless grounding"6 
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based in individual and collective lived experience, understood not as a set of 
atomic historical facts or partial intuitive givens of a greater whole but as the 
revelatory and constantly shifting temporal structure of our historical being-in-
the-world. 
II. Heidegger and the Soil of History: Historicity as Temporal Difference 
Heidegger's Being and Time presents a sustained phenomenological discussion 
of historicity in terms of such a structure of temporal difference, revealingly 
described in terms of "the soil of history." In describing the "stretching" of 
Dasein through time. the fact that Dasein experiences the world as a series of 
'"nows" but is still a single, continuous being in being-towards death, Hei-
degger writes, "the question of Dasein's 'connectedness' is the ontological 
problem of Dasein 's historizing. To lay bare the structure of historizing. and 
the existential-temporal conditions of its possibility, signifies that one has 
achieved an ontological understanding of historicality."7 For Heidegger, regu-
lar "world" history presupposes a prior relation rooted in the historical nature 
of Dasein's existence: "Historicality, as a determinate character, is prior to 
what is called "history" (world-historical historizing). "Historicality" stands 
for the state of Being that is constitutive for Dasein's 'historizing' as such; only 
on the basis of such 'historizing' is anything like world-history possible or can 
anything belong historically to world-history."8 
This historicality of Dasein is differentiated from that of mere objects be-
longing to the world, which are "world-historical," by means of a structure of 
what we above called "temporal difference." The objects of everyday history 
are considered by Heidegger to be "secondarily historical," whereas Dasein is 
"primarily historical."9 The distinction between primary and secondary histori-
cality expresses the relation between the rapidly shifting system of historically 
determined human meanings, on the one hand, and on the other hand the sense-
giving structures of the world that determine what we do and how we live 
while themselves continuing to change but at a comparatively glacial pace. 
According to Heidegger, ordinary ''factual'' conceptions of history have re-
versed this priority, regarding the historicality of objects as primary and at-
tempting to understand Dasein's historicality secondarily on the basis of this 
objectivity. Historicity is exhibited by restoring the primary historicality of 
Dasein while continuing to respect the irreducible temporal difference between 
lived time and secondary "world-historical" time. 
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It is no accident that this difference between temporalities, if we notice it at 
all, tends to become evident when familiar spatiotemporal objects in our lives 
suddenly shift - to describe it in Heideggerian tenns - from being ready-to 
hand to revealing aspects that appear to us as merely present-at-hand. Sud-
denly I notice the wear-and-tear on the armchair I sit in every day, and remem-
ber the time when it was new. But it did not age with me - I did not encounter 
its aging with every sitting, and it did not seem - as might, e.g., my own body 
-to be getting a little older each day. It is only suddenly. now, that it strikes me 
as having aged. Its historical change crept up on me, so to speak, so slowly that 
I did not (could not) notice it in the intervening instances of use. Because of the 
position of the inquirer within history, the character of historicity remains hid-
den from ordinary objective analysis. 
Heidegger suggests that this is at least partially responsible for the concep-
tual difficulties of an account of historical knowledge. Any analysis of history 
from the objective perspective of the scientist will ultimately fail because the 
objects the scientist would treat are already themselves historical and thus can-
not tell us anything about the underlying conditions of historicity. 
Even if the problem of history is treated in accordance with a theory of science. not only 
aiming at the ·epistemological' clarification of the historiological way of grasping things 
(Simmel) or at the logic with which the concepts of historiologial presentation arc fonned 
(Rickert). but doing so with an orientation towards 'the side of the object.' then. as long as 
the question is formulated this way. history becomes in principle accessible only as the 
Object of a science. Thus the basic phenomenon of history. which is prior to any possible 
thematizing by historiology and underlies it. has been irretrievably put aside. 1" 
The basic phenomenon of history must be prior to al I particular historical ob-
jects because historicality, as an "essential constitutive state" of historical sub-
jects. ultimately concerns historical ontological conditions not only for the ob-
jects of the world but also, and more primarily, for Dasein. The positivist, in 
conceiving history as an object for scientific analysis akin to any other, ignores 
the fact that history is a phenomenon that occurs for me not primarily as an 
object in the world but as an actively temporalizing subject engaged in basic 
relations of equipmental use, relations whose immediate possibilities are struc-
tured by the broader horizon of historical objects present at hand. We must 
recognize both the independent historicity of the object the armchair's aging 
"when I wasn't looking'' - and the fact that it is nonetheless an historical arti-
fact only in relation to me: "What is primarily historical is Dasein. That which 
is secondarily historical, however, is what we encounter within-the-world- not 
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only equipment ready-to-hand, in the widest sense, but also the environing 
nature as 'the very soil of history'" 11 • It is no accident that Heidegger refers 
here to the "soil of history" [geschichtlicher Boden]. Moving away from Hei-
degger for a moment, we can easily recognize that geology, viewed as a field 
of scientific inquiry in the everyday sense, takes as its object a set of natural 
spatiotemporal structures in which nothing is completely fixed. Even the soil 
that is most compacted, even that which is "set in stone" will not, from the 
strictest physico-chemical standpoint, last forever. Even the oldest of geologi-
cal formations are changing from the standpoint of the "long duree." Indeed, 
the study of geology has been of great value to branches of human knowledge 
far removed from its own arena of inquiry precisely because of its ability to> 
function as a measure of change and of time from the standpoint not of days 
years but of millennia or eons. Importantly, it is only capable of measuri 
these broad changes through evidence presented in the changes to itself: 
sedimentary layers of rock represent geological change by themselves ma 
festing it. They serve as a yardstick of the passing of time only because they 
also themselves affected by it, albeit at a scale very different from the temp 
experience of individual human beings. If the geological were not itself c 
ble of historical change it could not serve as a record of history, but comp 
to the more "primordial" temporality of Dasein, "nothing present-at-hand' 
time,' whether passing away or still coming along, could ever - by its o 
logical essence - be temporal in such a way."
12 
The geological tropes are illustrative of this temporal difference prec 
because they are an immediately recognizable but at the same time ex 
case. As beings of the modern scientific world, we recognize that the a · 
the rockface is in principle not different from the aging of my easy chair. 
the sublimity of the rate of change, as we might put it, in the geological, 
ly present-at-hand case makes it all the more striking in relation to ou 
historical being as equipmentally involved subjects in the world. For 
logical manifests its wear and tear only on the scale of eons, whereas the 
in the condition of my armchair is noticeable in the space of just a few 
of use. 
Stated schematically, then, geological tropes point to a temporal di 
between two levels or systems of historical entities. On one level we 
immediate and meaningful experience as historical subjects. At the 
level we have those relatively constant and relatively determinant pers.· 
~++i..: rnrwlrl-historical on the basis of which the continuity of meanin 
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sci~us experience depends, even as this objective historicality is ultimately 
denved .from our own. This temporal difference is from a phenomenological 
standpoint the very structure of historicity. But this structure is also never com-
pletely closed off or determined: it holds open a place for the characteristic 
contingency of lived experience in the face of historical determination. 
HI. Sedimentation in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty: 
Historicity as Determined and Spontaneous 
In addition to the formal structure defined by temporal difference, geological 
trope~ also help to further specify the role of the contingent in the historicity of 
expenence: for the historical is always manifested through a particular content 
that is never completely determined by the historical formations from which it 
a:os~. In H~sserl's Cri~is, this interplay of historical determination and expe-
nential co~tmgency anses in descriptions of the relative constancy that per-
vades the hfeworld despite its constant alteration: ""the world of lice · t b 11 ••• 1s, o e 
sure, related to subjectivity throughout the constant alteration of its relative 
aspects. But however it changes and however it may be corrected, it holds to its 
essentially lawful set of types, to which all life, and thus all science, of which 
it i~ the "ground," remain bound." 13 Historicity is for Husserl, as for the early 
Heidegger, the structure of temporal difference through which we understand 
the constant alteration of the relation between the lifeworld and subiectivit 
• J ~ 
esp1te the constant flux of experience, the historical phenomena of the Jife-
rld nonetheless hold to an essential - for Husserl this means ultimately tran-
ndental lawfulness. But this "a priori of history" is only visible to us be-
se ~fthe historical sedimentation oflayers of meaning built up according to 
gam, then, as for Heidegger, history can be understood only as a phenom-
n/or us, as ~ubjectivities, and in this sense history is "from the start nothing 
er than t~e vital movement of the coexistence and the interweaving of orig-
fo~matwns and sedimentations of meaning" according to a structurally 
rmmant formal law. 14 
ut, as Husserl acknowledges in one of the Beilagen to the main texts of The 
is, this seems to suggest a sort of paradox: 
~ere a pecu'.iar_qu~stion arises. When we methodically and systematically bring to recogni-
t10n the_ a pnonof history, is th'.s itself a facticity ofhistory'l Does it not then presuppose 
:ea pnonofh1sto7? .The a pnon 1s related to the being of mankind and the surrounding 
orld that is valid for It m experience. thinking, and acting. But the a priori is something 
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ideal and general, which on the one hand refers to men themselves as objects and on the 
other hand is a structure within men, in us who form it. 15 
If meaning only exists within our subjective and intersubjective lifeworld, 
which is itself a result of the conceptual possibilities established by the sedi-
mentation of meaning structures acquired throughout history, the determining 
structures for this lifeworld could never themselves have distinguishable dis-
crete meanings. Indeed, Husserl generally refers to this all-important, underly-
ing a priori lawfulness in very broad and nonspecific terms, as a "general 
ground" or "immense structural a priori" or something "ideal and general." In 
a sense, its structuring role relegates it to the status of mere posit. Like Hei-
degger's "historicality, as a logical structure underlying both history and the 
lifeworld, the a priori of history is prior to both, and thus, it would seem, prior 
even to any categories needed to further define it. 
The account of"Galileo's mathematization of nature" in the first part of The 
Crisis is an illustration of this conception of historicity. Despite the fact that 
we each perceive the world somewhat differently, and have different "ontic 
validities," we nonetheless tacitly agree about some qualities of the world we 
share. The subject of this agreement is in a given "thematic" reflection usually 
a specific element of cultural formation or of our now habitually scientific 
lifeworld, but in each case the regularity depends upon more basic universally 
accepted structures ascribed to the pre-scientifically self-given and "obvious" 
characteristics of the world ofexperience. 16 Husserl's principal point is not so 
much that the "original geometer" is capable of discovering such self-evident 
structures, but that geometry itself can only be understood insofar as it is built 
upon them. As he puts it, "The whole of the cultural present, understood as a 
totality, 'implies' the whole of the cultural past in an undetermined but struc-
turally determined generality." 17 
What does it mean for the generality of our present - as a totality - to imply 
our past- again, as a totality- in a way that is at once undetermined but struc-
turally determined? Is this not an obvious contradiction, another version of the 
paradox of the a priori of history noted above? For Husserl the paradox is only 
apparent, and arises from a failure to distinguish between the dual temptations 
of historical relativism and historical determinism. The relation of our cultural 
present to our cultural past is undetermined, insofar as we can never establish 
perfect one-to-one correlations or exact causal links between past events and 
present ones. This is a phenomenon very familiar to the historian: to say that 
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Great War was "caused" by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand is not to 
say that this was its sole and exclusive cause. Indeed, many historians would 
claim that it is impossible, even in principle, to map out completely the com-
plex interplay of causes that led to such an event, and perhaps, by extension, to 
any event. To think that such a perfect mapping of causes to effects is possible 
is to succumb to a version of historical determinism, since it implies that the 
present is nothing more than the totality of properly understood past causes. 
Husserl's claim that the cultural present stands in a relation of undetermined 
generality to the cultural past instead admits the contingency of history and of 
happenings; the fact that historicity as a lived phenomenon does not consist of 
a series of one-to-one causes and effects but is structured not only by past ho-
rizons (retentions) but also by future possibilities (protentions). 
At the same time, Husserl claims, the cultural present in its totality is related 
to the cultural past in its totality in a structurally determined way. Despite the 
indeterminacy of individual relations between past objectivities and present 
subjective experience, there is still a general dependency: in a very general 
sense, it is correct to say that my cultural present is structurally dependent 
upon my cultural past. Meaningful experience does not exist in a vacuum, and 
does not amount to an historical relativism of "one damn thing after another" 
only to be made sense of by means of the generalizations of an external ob-
server. As Heidegger showed, the temporal difference between the primary 
historicality of subjects and the secondary historicality of objects holds open a 
horizonal structure of anticipation for the subject, who experiences history 
from within history. Husserl emphasizes that this structure in each case de-
pends upon the actual events of the past despite the specific relations within the 
structure never being completely predetermined, or even similarly determined 
for different individual subjectivities. The relation between the cultural present 
and the cultural past is thus formally fixed because of sedimentation, which 
manifests the structural determinacy of the historical, but never completely 
detennined in its content: in the case of any specific subject's tracing back of 
evidences, an undetermined element - the specific material that fulfills the 
structurally determined meaning intention in a given case - is always some-
thing there to be discovered. 
It may seem strange to refer to a "content" or material here, since we are not 
dealing directly with fixed meanings or objects but with elements in an experi-
ential relational structure. But Husserl recognizes that this structure must - in 
a logical sense - have material as well as formal components, and it is pre-
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cisely this insight that distinguishes these accounts of history from speculative 
accounts described above. Since our phenomenological investigations always 
begin from the now-moment, there is not - even in principle - any final God's 
eye view from which historical events could be exhaustively explained in terms 
of an unfolding of fully determinant ideal laws. The understanding of historic-
ity in its constantly changing manifestations in lived experience is thus a cen-
tral and defining element of the broader project of phenomenology as an ongo-
ing methodological movement or "infinite task." For Husserl, transcendental 
logic is never fixed, and we cannot rest content with a once-and-for-all deduc-
tion of the categories of meaning because this contradicts the evidence oflived 
experience. 
To the suspicious critic, such formally defined but materially open space in 
the structure of history will look like a loophole in the theory; an unjustified 
posit that ''lets in" an outside element or an undesirable "opening" in what is 
expected to be a closed logical system. But such suspicion arises from an ex-
pectation that the relation between that which is historically determined and 
that which does the determining must be fixed in all respects, either as decided 
through a process of external scientific observation or as intuited from within 
as a momentary glimpse of the whole. 
Husserl's phenomenological investigation of history recognizes not only 
specific experienced historical facts but also the structural, "formal" regulari-
ties of the experiencing itself, the characteristic historicity that governs the 
sedimentation of meaning in time. This recognition of the complex interplay of 
the formal and the material manifests phenomenology's radical break with the 
way history and epistemology were previously understood: as Husserl writes, 
"the ruling dogma of the separation in principle between epistemological elu-
cidation and historical, even humanistic-psychological explanation, between 
epistemological and genetic origin, is fundamentally mistaken ... " 18 In The 
Crisis, historicity thus plays a central role in the phenomenological analysis of 
constitutions, "the tracing of the historical meaning-structures given in the pre-
sent, or their self-evidences, along the documented chain of historical back-
references into the hidden dimension of the primal self-evidences which under-
lie them." 19 History consists of sedimentations on the basis of self-evidences, 
but these sedimentations can be examined both in terms of their specific con-
tent and in their structural and formal generality, but in a way that never ig-
nores the manifest openness of lived experiencing. 
Husserl's analysis thus shows that the gap between historical facticity as 
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fixed object of study and historicity as fonnal condition of subjective being-in-
the-world is filled out by contingent logically material variables, just as, in 
geology, less "durable" elements such as water and air are gradually com-
pressed out, evaporated, or otherwise expelled in a variety a/processes as the 
underlying geological layers become more compacted, resulting in an ever-
more-hardened and more-durable though never eternally fixed layer of the 
natural historical record. This variety of processes is always partially but never 
entirely determined by the geological elements that both affect and are affected 
by it, just as there is never an exact and perfect founding of one level of the 
geo-historical record upon the other: the geological functions as historical re-
cord not only by means of a regular pattern of sedimentation according to the 
fixed logic of gravity but also through eruptions, through erosions, and even 
through tectonic shifts. The relationship between the levels of the geological 
record is thus structurally necessary but not fixed in its content or manner of 
appearing. 
Thus, as Merleau-Ponty notes in his taking up of Husserl's seminal historical 
concept in The Phenomenology of Perception, 
this word ·sedimentation· must not trick us: this contracted knowledge is not an inert mass 
at the foundation of our consciousness . ., My acquired thoughts are not an absolute acquisi-
tion: they teed off my present thought at each moment... The acquired. then. is only truly 
acquired if it is taken up in a new movement of thought. and a thought is only situated if it 
itself assumes its situation. The essence of consciousness is to provide itself with one or 
many worlds. to make its own thoughts exist inji-ont of itself like things. and sketching out 
these landscapes and abandoning them indivisibly demonstrates its vitality. The structure 
·world.· \Yith its double movement of sedimentation and spontaneity. is at the center of 
consciousness ... "' 
Sedimentation as an historical phenomenon is not primarily an object but a 
vital activity, one which always involves two movements: that of settling into 
passivity and that of "spontaneity." Sedimentation is thus never complete de-
termination: '"Were it possible to unfold at each moment all of the presupposi-
tions in what I call my 'reason' or my 'ideas,' then I would always be discover-
ing experiences that have not been made explicit; weighty contributions of the 
past and of the present and an entire 'sedimented history' that does not merely 
concern the genesis of my thought, but that determines its sense."c. 1 The result 
of such a conception of history would be a one-dimensional sedimentary struc-
ture, in which the formal laws of the "a priori of history'' were the sole and 
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exclusive defining feature of historicity. This would be complete historical 
determinism. 
At the same time, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes, the constant flux of the play-
ing out of history seen in total abstraction from its sedimented meanings would 
amount to mere raw action; to the positivist's claim that time simply passes 
bringing with it an unordered confusion of "one damn thing after another." 
Thus despite - and indeed because of- the founding of history in the structure 
of temporal difference, historical knowledge presupposes a certain deference 
to determining sedimentary structures even as it demands the experiential 
spontaneity of the subject: 
[H]ere again, we must recognize a sort of sedimentation of our life: when an attitude to-
ward the world has been confim1ed often enough, it becomes privileged for us. If freedom 
does not tolerate being confronted by any motive, then my habitual being in the world is 
equally fragile at each moment. .. The rationalist altemative--either the free act is possible 
or not, either the event originates in me or is imposed from outside--does not fit with our 
relations with the world and with our past. Our freedom does not destroy our situation, but 
gears into it: so long as we are alive, our situation is open, which implies both that it calls 
forth privileged modes of resolution and that it, by itself, lacks the power to procure any of 
them. 22 
The trope of sedimentation illustrates the phenomenological insight that free-
dom and its containment are always codependent parts in the structure of his-
toricity: experience as an historical structure for individual and collective sub-
jectivities manifests both predetermination and spontaneity. It is the need for 
such spontaneity, for a contingency in the system, that a phenomenological 
account of history (as opposed to a deterministic conception) recognizes. It 
takes it as a given that our experience often has the character of thrownness or 
subjection to the unexpected. And yet, unlike the positivist's conception of his-
tory as a series of otherwise random facts made sense of from the outside, 
phenomenology recognizes that our accounts of history are always structured 
by the internal logic of own historicity. The word "sedimentation" is thus not a 
vague, catch-all metaphor covering up a lack of descriptive exactness, but a 
description offered in fidelity to the lived reality of the things themselves. 
IV. Conclusion: Phenomenology's "Grounding" of History 
in the Movement of Historicity 
In our brief treatment of phenomenology's use of the geological trope, we 
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have seen the same basic conception of historicity expressed in Heidegger's 
explication of the structure of temporal difference in tenns of the "soil of his-
" and in Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's reflections on "sedimentation" as 
the structure of the past's "undetermined but structurally determined generali-
"23 We have argued that these geological tropes point to a middle path in the 
philosophy of history, one that avoids both positivist conceptions of history 
and the speculative historical determinism they arose in reaction to, but does so 
by orienting its account to the internal movement of temporality instead of an 
external and immutable ground. 
This internal movement oftemporality occurs in a context of temporal dif-
ference, but one in which, as Heidegger shows, the lived temporality of the 
subject is always primordial against the background of the secondary historic-
ity of objects and facts. This temporal difference resists a complete determin-
ism about history, leaving itself partially open to the spontaneous character of 
lived human experience while remaining grounded by the hardened sedimenta-
tion of past events. Considered reflectively, history is thus a structure of con-
straint, since it has always-already limited what counts as meaningful and 
valuable in what we say and do, but this constraining role is never complete: As 
Merleau-Ponty insists, our spontaneity "gears into" our determined situation. It 
is the inherent inconstancy of the geological as much as its durability and dura-
tion that is definitive of its use in phenomenological accounts of history. It is 
only because of the internal temporality of geological processes - the fact that 
the long-lasting determining structures themselves erode, compact, shift and 
sediment - that allows them to function as a measure of the much more rapid 
change of other elements of our lived environment. The geological, despite its 
glacial pace of change, represents an ultimately shifting "bedrock." 
These two opposed and complementary aspects of the geological trope sug-
gest a characterization of history that is not metaphysically grounded in some-
thing external, objective, and timeless. Phenomenology's "grounding" of his-
torical knowledge is thus ultimately "Copernican'' in the Kantian sense: while 
it acknowledges the (relative) fixity and historical facticity of objects and 
events, it argues for the dependence of this historicity on the more primordial 
historicity of the experiencing subject. But since this very primordial historic-
ity is understood in terms of the ongoing task of investigating the changing 
structures of lived experiencing, and not in terms of categories determinable 
once-and-for-all, this is no simple stable ground, but a movement, an infinite 
task whose center of gravity is not any object "out there," but the lived tempo-
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rality of human historical experience: the always-eventful sedimentation of the 
soil of history. 
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